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Abstract
A surprise demonetization, where certain or all denominations of currency notes
cease to be legal tender on a short notice, can be understood as a severe payment sys-
tem shock requiring agents to immediately shift to alternative payment mechanisms.
I use a short-term macroeconomic model based on Willamson (2009) featuring goods
and financial market segmentation to analyze the effect of such a shock in an economy
with substantial informality and cash dependence. The quantitative characterization
of the equilibrium dynamics using a deterministic example shows significant level
as well as redistributive effects in the very short run. The households with access to
formal financial markets experience an increase in consumption and those without
such access experience a decline. Most of these effects come from differential access
to formal financial markets as a consumption smoothing mechanism.
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1 Introduction
The announcement by the PrimeMinister of India onNovember 8, 2016 that deemed | 500
and | 1000 currency denominations illegal as tender is what is usually referred to as “de-
monetization" in case of the Indian economy. Many developing countries have engaged
in such policies where certain or all denominations of currency notes were declared ille-
gal to be used as payments. 1. In India the denominations that were demonetized in 2016
constituted 86% of currency in circulation at that time. This together with the fact that
significant proportion of transactions in India are cash based, the policy announcement
brought the economy to a literal halt. As people scrambled to their banks to exchange
their old currency notes for new ones, they also resorted to using alternative payment
mechanisms to pay for their purchases. In fact, the shift in the government’s narrative
from controlling corruption to moving the economy to digital payments or ‘less-cash’
economy in the days following the initial announcement may be partly in response to the
persistent cash shortage.2
It took about two years for the currency in circulation to be back to the pre- November
2016 level (see Figure 1). Thus, demonetization was not only a major surprise shock to
the payments system of the Indian economy, but also a significantly protracted one. To
understand the short term effects of this massive and persistent policy shock, this paper
uses amacroeconomicmodel that features assets and goodsmarket segmentation. I adapt
the model in Williamson (2009) to represent economic characteristics and structure of a
typical developing economy with large informal sector and heavy dependence on cash as
a method of payment. This paper could be thought of as a technical extension of Waknis
(2017).
2 Market Segmentation in the Indian Economy
A typical developing economy like India can thought of being constituted by two groups
of households and firms. One group of households and firms that uses formal finan-
1For an interesting historical example, see https://scroll.in/article/821406/demonetisation-lessons-
how-tughlaqs-unplanned-currency-change-in-14th-century-india-led-to-chaos
2See (Rai (2016)) for how the narrative of the government changed in the months following demoneti-
zation.
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Figure 1: Behavior of Currency in Circulation in India
cial markets for financing consumption and working capital and investment respectively.
The other group of households and firms use informal financial markets for financing
consumption and working capital and investment respectively. They also use cash more
intensively than the first group. Following, Williamson (2009), I call the first group as the
‘connected households and firms’ and the second group as ‘unconnected households and
firms’.
The connected and unconnected dichotomy may also manifest in goods markets. For
example, connected households may be more likely to shop at shopping malls or chain
market stores (More, Big Bazaar, etc) as well as online (Big Basket, Grofers, Amazon, etc)
compared to unconnected households. Given that the suppliers of goods and services
to such stores are most likely the connected firms, this implies that goods and services
produced by connected firms will be bought by connected households more than by un-
connected households. Financial market segmentation could also further goods market
segmentation where formal financial intermediaries sell financial services to connected
consumers to finance their purchases from connected businesses 3.
The connected- unconnected distinction or segmentation could further be extended
3The author, who works in the formal sector and uses formal financial markets to smooth consump-
tion, has experienced several episodes of credit cards being offered or marketed while shopping at various
shopping malls in Delhi and other cities in India.
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Table 1: Market Segmentation in India
Connected Sector Unconnected Sector
Organized sector firms and households
supplying labor and capital to them
Unorganized sector firms and households
supplying labor and capital to them
Use formal financial markets to manage
liquidity
Use informal financial markets to manage
liquidity
Use electronic payments systems to fi-
nance purchases
Use cash to finance purchases.
Represents 25-30% of non-agricultural
workforce
Represents 70-75% of non-agricultural
workforce
to the organized/unorganized or formal/informal sector. There is considerable overlap
between organized and formal sector and unorganized and informal sector respectively.
As argued by (Ghani, Kerr, and Segura, 2015, pp.2), "Establishments in the unorganized
sector in India are unregistered, do not pay taxes, and are generally outside the purview
of the state, which closely parallels common definitions of the informal sector in other
countries". Therefore, the terms informal and unorganized as well as formal and orga-
nized can used interchangeably. Applying the definition of connected and unconnected
firms to this distinction then implies that informal or unorganized firms would mainly
constitute the unconnected firms, while the formal or organized firms would constitute
the connected forms category. Table 1 gives the general distinctive features of these two
groups of households and firms in the Indian economy. This division is also in line with
the survey of literature and stylized facts about informal labor and credit markets in Ba-
tini, Kim, Levine, and Lotti (2011).
In reality, there may be or is some overlap in these two sectors. For example, many
small and medium registered enterprises would be a part of formal sector but may de-
pend on informal financial markets and cash to finance working capital. For simplicity,
we assume that such overlap is not quantitatively significant to start with. This assump-
tion can be relaxed later.
This paper is related to the literature on asset market segmentation and monetary pol-
icy that grew out of Grossman and Weiss (1983), Lucas (1990), and Rotemberg (1984).
In these models monetary policy has real effects despite prices being flexible and this
4
is a result primarily arising out of asset market segmentation. The key innovation in
Williamson (2009) is to integrate the literature on asset market segmentation, goods mar-
ket segmentation and payment system economics. Payment system research deals with
“the interaction between decentralized media of exchange (fiat money) and centralized
payment arrangements.”((Williamson, 2003, pp.476)). Examples of this research include
Freeman (1996), Temzelides and Williamson (2001), and Nosal and Rocheteau (2006).
There have been several journalistic articles and shorter research papers published
since November 2016 dealing with different aspects of the demonetization and its effects
using economic models.4. Chodorow-Reich, Gopinath, Mishra, and Narayanan (2018)
present an analysis of demonetization using several datasets arguing that it caused de-
cline in economic activity and therefore cash was essential for Indian economy. The pa-
per closest to this one in spirit and substance is Bajaj and Damodaran (2018) which looks
at the effects of digitization and demonetization in a shadow economy model based on
Lagos and Wright (2005) and Gomis-Porqueras, Peralta-Alva, and Waller (2014). In their
model, demonetizing legal tender comes at a short run cost and can potentially improve
welfare but only in the presence of multiple equilibria.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model,
Section 4 discusses the experiment using a deterministic example. Section 5 provides
some concluding thoughts and directions for future research.
3 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely-lived households with unit mass
indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. The household is constituted by a seller and a continuum of con-
sumers with unit mass. The consumer is indexed by (i, j) with j uniformly distributed on
the interval [0,1]. The household’s preferences are given by:
E0
∞
∑
t=0
∫ 1
0
log[cit(j)]dj (1)
The ’t’ is the time index and cit(j) is the consumption of consumer j from household i
with each household residing at separate location. Out of the total households, α gives the
4See Ramakumar (2017)-an edited volume of all the articles published on demonetization and black
economy in the Economic and Political Weekly over years including after the November 2016 episode.
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Table 2: Probabilities faced by households
Goods sold
by
Connected Consumer Unconnected Consumer
Connected
Seller
1− (1− α)pi αpi
Unconnected
Seller
(1− α)pi 1− αpi
proportion of connected households. pi governs the interaction between connected and
unconnected households. If pi < 1, then among the households arriving at a connected
location to buy goods, higher proportion will be connected households than would be
observed on an unconnected location. In other words, when pi < 1, the probability that a
connected household trades with a connected one is higher and similarly for the uncon-
nected household. Therefore, pi also captures “the degree of preference of consumers for
goods produced by their own type or the degree of local preference" Williamson (2008).
At pi = 1, the population of consumers is identical in composition across locations during
shopping or we can think of it as the consumer’s preferred good being a random draw.
Given these parameters, the following table gives the probabilities for the trades that each
of the connected and unconnected households would possibly engage in.
All goods are sold on credit with goods exchanged for IOUs. There are N networks
in the economy indexed i = 1,2,3, ...,n, with member of household i only able to commu-
nicate with other households in network i and i + 1 (modulo N). With probability γt, a
seller meets a consumer from his network i and with probability 1− γt a counsumer from
network i+ 1. When the seller meets a consumer, she can identify if the consumer is from
a connected or an unconnected household. If the seller and consumer belong to the same
network then transactions takes place on a net settlement basis. On the other hand, if the
seller and the consumer belong to different networks, transactions take place on a cash
settlement basis. The law of large numbers then implies that each seller will sell a frac-
tion γt consumers from her own network and to 1− γt consumers outside the network.
Therefore, γt also signifies the "net settlement" rate in this economy.
Within network transactions are netted out and payment is made or received in out-
side money during the same period depending on the net debt position of the household.
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Once, the within network debt is settled, outside network transactions are settled with
outside money in the next period through cash settlement. Therefore, there is a delay in
at the central bank crediting households for receipt of outside money. As described in
(Williamson, 2009, p.347),
a sale of goods in a net settlement transaction results in a within-period credit
that can be used to finance consumer expenditure by the household during
the period. However, a sale of goods in a cash-settlement transaction yields
outside money balances that cannot be spent until the next period.
The connected and unconnected households differ primarily in terms of their partic-
ipation in the formal financial markets. The connected households hold a bank account
with a bank that has reserve account with the central bank. This allows the banks in con-
nected households to convert currency into reserve balances with the central bank. These
households also buy and sell bonds and access within period central bank credit. After
goods market transactions are over and before the clearing and settlement process begins,
the connected households trade with the central bank exchanging three objects- reserve
balances, within period central bank credit, and one period nominal bonds. The con-
nected household receives reserve balances at the beginning of the period and repays rt
units of reserve balances at the end of period for each unit borrowed. A one period nomi-
nal bond allows the household to earn Rt+1 units of reserves balances in period t+ 1. The
unconnected households, on the other hand, do not trade with any bank or the central
bank and hold and use outside money as currency.
Batinietall survey of informal goods and credit markets.
3.1 Budget and Finance Constraints
The above description about the financial participation of the households contingent on
their being connected or unconnected implies that the households will be optimizing their
utility subject to two constraints: a budget constraint and a finance constraint. While the
budget constraint states that total expenditure should be less than or equal to income,
the finance constraint is similar to a cash in advance constraint. It not only spells out all
the available payment mechanisms available to a household to finance its expenditure
but also reflects the feature of the model that income from cash settlement transaction is
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Figure 2: Transactions between households
available for use only in the next period. These constraints will look a little different for
each household depending on whether it is connected or unconnected.
The set of transactions that can occur in this economy populated by connected and
unconnected households is given by Figure 2. The connected households are indexed by
the superscript 1 and the unconnected households by 2. ciit denotes consumption through
net settlement and diit denotes consumption through cash settlement. p
i
t and q
i
t are the
prices of goods sold in net settlement and cash settlement respectively. xit are the total
sales through net settlement for a given type of household.
The following is the finance constraint for the connected household:
[1− (1− α)pi][γtp1t c11t + (1− γt)q1t d11t ] + (1− α)pi[γtp2t c12t + (1− γt)q2t d12t ] + bt+1
≤ stm1t + p1t x1t + lt + Rtbt − τ1t (2)
and the budget constraint for the connected household is:
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[1− (1− α)pi][γtp1t c11t +(1−γt)q1t d11t ] + (1− α)pi[γtp2t c12t +(1−γt)q2t d12t ] + bt+1+m1t+1
≤ stm1t + p1t x1t + q1t (y− x1t ) + (rt − 1)lt + Rtbt − τ1t − τ2t (3)
Equation 2 states “that total household expenditure on goods and nominal bondsmust
be financed by the money balances with which the household begins the period, plus the
IOUs acquired during the net settlement period" (Williamson, 2009, p.348). On the other
hand, equation 3 states that total expenditure on goods, nominal bonds, and the amount
of money that the household decides to carry to the next period (m1t+1) cannot exceed total
income from various sources.
The following is the finance constraint for the unconnected household:
αpi[γtp1t c
21
t + (1 − γt)q1t d21t ] + (1 − αpi)[γtp2t c22t + (1 − γt)q2t d22t ] ≤ m2t + p2t x2t (4)
and the budget constraint for the connected household is:
αpi[γtp1t c
21
t + (1− γt)q1t d21t ] + (1− αpi)[γtp2t c22t + (1− γt)q2t d22t ] +m2t+1
≤ m2t + p2t x2t + q2t (y− x2t ) (5)
The fact that unconnected households do not participate in the formal financial mar-
ket is evident from the terms that are absent in their finance and budget constraints as
compared to those for the connected households. Equation 4 states that the unconnected
households have the amount of money they start with and IOUs from the net settlement
trades to finance their total expenditure on goods. The budget constraint given by equa-
tion 5 states that total expenditure by a unconnected household on goods and the amount
of money to be carried to the next period cannot exceed the proceeds from net settlement
sales, cash settlement sales, and money balances at the start of the period.
Another difference between constraints for connected and unconnected households is
the absence of tax terms in that of the later. The unconnected households do not pay taxes
as is typical of households and firms from the informal sector.
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3.1.1 Government
Government finances its interest expenditure through lump sum taxes keeping the aggre-
gate net quantity of nominal government bonds constant. The budget constraint for the
government is given as:
αM1t+1+(1− α)M2t+1= stαM1t +(1− α)M2t − αBt+1+RtαBt− (rt− 1)αLt− ατ1t− ατ2t
(6)
The taxes financing the interest expenditure of the government are levied in a way not
to have any distributional consequences. The expressions are as follows:
τ1t = (Rt − 1)Bt + (st − 1)M1t (7)
τ2t = −(rt − 1)Lt (8)
The choice variables for the government are (st,Bt+1,Lt,τ1t,τ2t) at the beginning of
period t. The gross interest rates rt and Rt are determined by the market and the money
supply by the equations above.
3.2 Equilibrium
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium for this economy consists of quantities and allo-
cations (xit, c
ii
t , d
ii
t ) and prices (p
i
t, q
i
t, rt, Rt+1) such that:
1. Households maximize their utility function (equation 1) subject to the respective
budget and finance constraints.
2. Markets for goods at connected and unconnected locations in net settlement as well
as cash settlement clear.
3. Markets for assets clear.
4. Government satisfies its budget constraint in equation 6.
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Solving the optimization problem for the households gives the following equilibrium
equations. 5
qit =
ψit
yωit
[(1− γt)ωit + γt] (9)
pit =
ψit
y
[(1− γt)ωit + γt] (10)
xit =
γty
(1− γt)ωit + γt
(11)
for i=1,2. Where
ω1t = βst+1z
1
t Et(
1
z1t+1
) (12)
ω2t = βz
2
t Et(
1
z2t+1
) (13)
Consumption allocations are given by:
cijt = x
j
t
zit
γtψ
j
t
(14)
dijt = (y− xjt)
zit
(1− γt)ψjt
(15)
In the above equilibrium solutions, z1t is the nominal expenditure by a connected
household and z2t by an unconnected household in period t. These are given by:
z1t =
[1− γt(1− αpi)][M1t + Bt − Bt+1 + Lt] + (1− α)piγtM2t
(1− γt)[1− γt(1− pi)] (16)
z2t =
αpiγt[M1t + Bt − Bt+1 + Lt] + (1− γt[1− (1− α)pi])M2t
(1− γt)[1− γt(1− pi)] (17)
5Solution details available on request.
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Given the above definitions of z1t and z
2
t , the nominal expenditure on goods produced
by a connected and an unconnected household is represented by ψ1t and ψ
2
t respectively.
These are given by:
ψ1t = [1− (1− α)pi]z1t + (1− α)piz2t (18)
ψ2t = αpiz
1
t + (1− αpi)z2t (19)
A monetary policy is a stochastic process for Bt+1,Lt, st+1∞t=0 given B0 = 0 and satisfy-
ing
M1t + Bt − Bt+1 + Lt > 0
and 1≤ st+1 ≤ Rt+1 for all t, which then determines a stochastic process for M1t ,M2t∞t=0
given M10 and M
2
0.
4 Demonetization- A Deterministic Example
Along with being a massive one time wealth shock, demonetization also acted as a severe
payment systems shock that forced people away from using cash to alternative non-cash
payment mechanisms. These alternatives could include localized credit arrangements,
use of paytm or other digital wallets, as well as debit and credit cards. As the uncon-
nected households do not participate in formal financial markets, they would have been
restricted to localized credit arrangements as payment mechanisms to finance their pur-
chases. However, in this model such credit arrangements are ruled out.
In terms of the model, if the demonetized currency as proportion of total currency in
circulation is significant, then demonetization becomes equivalent to restricting all trans-
actions to clear on net settlement basis until the economy is successfully and completely
remonetized. This can be represented as a one time sharp increase in γt with an eventual
decline as the economy is remonetized. Figure 3 depicts the calibration of γt that tries to
capture this behavior of the net settlement restriction.
Along with the forced net settlement requirement, the treatment of money balances
that the households hold and choose to carry forward also needs careful consideration.
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Figure 3: Calibrating γt
The demonetization announcement destroyed the value of 86% of currency in circulation
(See figure 1 above). Assuming that the unconnected household would be the ones that
we’re affected the most by this announcement, I allow M2t to fall drastically at first only
to steadily recover over the period of simulation. More specifically, both M1t and M
2
t start
at same level and then keeping M1t constant, I allow M
2
t decline initially and then recover
according to the following equation estimated using the data on currency in circulation.
Letting Mct be currency in circulation in period t (See Appendix B for details.),
Mct = 148
(354)
+ 0.992
(0.0200)
Mct−1 (20)
T = 98
R2 = 0.969
Suppose β = 0.96, pi = 0.2, α = 0.5, s = 1.05, and Bt = Lt = 0 for simulating the deter-
ministic example. Figure ?? below gives the calculated responses of different variables to
the demonetization announcement implemented as described above.
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We can see that for a connected household, consumption from net settlement pur-
chases from another connected household (c11t ) falls and then stays at a lower level for
the period of simulation (approximately 45 weeks). On the other hand, consumption
from net settlement purchases from an unconnected household (c12t ) shoots up and then
steadily declines as the net settlement restriction is relaxed. From panel c in Figure ??, it
can be seen that the level decline in c11t seems to be compensated by a level increase in
consumption from cash settlement purchases from other connected households, d11t .
For an unconnected household, consumption from net settlement purchases from an-
other connected household (c21t ) falls down drastically only to recover marginally while,
the consumption from net settlement purchases from another unconnected household
(c22t ) falls to start with and then increases only to fall with the relaxation of net settlement
restriction and remonetization of the economy. This is confirmed by the initial drastic
decline and a subsequent steady increase in consumption from cash settlement purchases
from another unconnected household, d22t . Despite, these variations in consumption al-
locations between net and cash settlement, note that in terms of levels, the consumption
of connected household remains higher than that of an unconnected household in all the
situations.
Both, the price of a net settlement (p1t ) as well as a cash settlement good (q
1
t ) for the
connected household shows a sharp increase and then a sharp decline as the economy
remonetizes. However, demonetization forces the initial q
1
t
p1t
> 1 to q
1
t
p1t
< 1 implying net
negative interest rate (rt − 1) on the intra day loans of reserve balances, lt. Given that
for this example, lt = 0 this does not affect any of the calculations. The economic im-
plication nonetheless stems from the rise in importance of the net settlement purchases
vis-a-vis cash settlement ones as a result of demonetization. In contrast, as the uncon-
nected households do not access formal financial markets, irrespective of the nature of
the sale, the cash is available for use only in the next period. Therefore, p2t and q
2
t track
each other closely over the policy experiment.
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
(g) (h)
Figure 4: Effects of Demonetization- change in net settlement and money
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In general, this being an endowment economy, the transmission of a payments system
shock can be expected to play out in the remaining variables. Clearly, consumption from
both net and cash settlement experiences variability for both connected and unconnected
households. This suggests that households may not have been able to trade all of their
endowment as a result of forcing net settlement payment mechanism on the agents in the
economy. How has the total consumption behaved for the two groups during this policy
experiment?
The last two panels in Figure 4 display this behavior of total consumption. Accord-
ingly, the connected households experience a sharp increase in consumption despite the
net settlement restriction and then an eventual decline to the pre demonetization level.
On the other hand, the unconnected households experience a decline in total consump-
tion initially only to recover slowly. This differential behavior reflects the fact that uncon-
nected households loose the value of their cash balances and regain it only slowly over a
period of time. Therefore, they are able to only slowly increase their consumption as new
cash becomes available through remonetization. The connected households on the other
hand can use their accounts with the central bank for net settlement without actually re-
quiring cash for settling debt and payments. Thus, the impact on consumption critically
depends on ability to smooth consumption through formal financial markets.
Thesemovements also suggest some redistribution of consumption from unconnected
households to connected households. This is because demonetization reserved the access
to goods and services markets to people using electronic payments systems in the very
short leading to the redistribution of consumption away from unconnected households.
To the extent, localized credit arrangements substituted use of money, this effect may not
have been as stark in reality as suggested by the model. The qualitative nature of the
impact predicted by the model nonetheless highlights important mechanisms through
which money implements allocations in an economy.
As a robustness check, we also look at the scenario where demonetization manifests
only as substantial reduction in the money supply for the unconnected households. As
is evident from the first two panels in Figure 5, the connected households experience an
increase in consumption in net settlement as well as cash settlement transactions with
unconnected households. Both these transactions imply transfer of cash from connected
households to unconnected households which is a standard transmission mechanism of
money supply shocks in segmented markets models. The next two panels describe the
16
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5: Effects of Demonetization- change in money for UCH only
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behavior of unconnected households. Because the demonetization shock hits these house-
holds themost, they experience a decline in consumption from net settlement transactions
with connected households. A connected household will not be ready to sell anything to
an unconnected household as the later is dependent on cash which is in short supply im-
mediately after the policy shock. On the other hand there is an increase in consumption
from net settlements with other unconnected transactions. This could be capturing the
dampening effect that localised credit arrangements would have on decline in consump-
tion of these households.
Overall, connected households experience an increase in total consumption imme-
diately after the policy shock and subsequent reversion to its pre-shock levels as econ-
omy remonetizes. The unconnected households experience a decline in total consump-
tion immediately after the policy shock and only a partial recovery towards pre-shock
level. Thus, considering both the numerical examples above, the most robust finding is
an immediate increase in total consumption for connected households and an immediate
decline in consumption for unconnected households.
5 Concluding Thoughts
In an economy where agents are segmented into two groups based on access to formal
financial markets or lack there off making outside money either necessary for payments
or not, a payments system shock like demonetization can have substantive real effects.
The model above attempts to capture the short run effects of such a policy shock in an
endowment economy with goods and financial market segmentation. The households
who lack access or do not use the formal financial markets to manage liquidity suffer a
temporary fall in consumption, while the households who access formal financial mar-
kets to manage liquidity are able to maintain their consumption at or above pre policy
shock level. The model suggests some redistribution of consumption from unconnected
consumers to connected consumers. The most robust finding is the immediate increase
in total consumption after the policy shock for connected households and an immediate
decrease for the unconnected households . This differential capacity to smooth consump-
tion suggests that such a payments system shock may not have had a neutral effect on the
economy. However, to capture the full effects of demonetization, including production in
the above model would be necessary.
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Appendix A Notation Summary:
p1t price of a net settlement good for connected household.
q1t price of a cash settlement good for connected household.
p2t price of a net settlement good for an unconnected household.
q2t price of a cash settlement good for an unconnected household.
x1t Sales by a connected household in a net settlement transaction.
x2t Sales by an unconnected household in a net settlement transaction.
τ1t nominal lumpsum tax on net settlement transaction.
τ2t nominal lumpsum tax on cash settlement transaction.
m1t starting money balances for a connected household.
m2t starting money balances for an unconnected household.
m1t+1 money balances carried to next period by a connected household.
m2t+1 money balances carried to next period by an unconnected household.
l1t quantity of within period credit from the central bank.
rt Gross nominal interest rate on within period central bank loan.
st Gross nominal interest rate on reserve balances from period t− 1 to the beginning of
period t.
Rt+1 Gross nominal interest rate on one period government bond issued in period t.
c11t consumption of consumers from connected households from net settlement transac-
tion with other connected households.
c12t consumption of consumers from connected households from net settlement transac-
tion with unconnected households.
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d11t consumption of consumers from connected households from cash settlement trans-
action with other connected households.
d12t consumption of consumers from connected households from cash settlement trans-
action with unconnected households.
c21t consumption of consumers from unconnected households from net settlement trans-
action with a connected household.
c22t consumption of consumers from unconnected households from net settlement trans-
action with other unconnected households.
d21t consumption of consumers fromunconnected households from cash settlement trans-
action with a connected household.
d22t consumption of consumers from unconnected households from net settlement trans-
action with an unconnected household.
ω1t relative prices of goods sold in net-settlement transactions to those sold in cash-settlement
transactions, in connected markets.
ω2t relative prices of goods sold in net-settlement transactions to those sold in cash-settlement
transactions, in unconnected markets.
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Appendix B AR 1 Model for Currency in Circulation
Model: OLS, using observations 2–99 (T = 98)
Dependent variable: CurrencyinCirculation
HAC standard errors, bandwidth 3 (Bartlett kernel)
Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 147.795 353.708 0.4178 0.6770
CurrencyinCirculation_1 0.992094 0.0199887 49.63 0.0000
Mean dependent var 15769.21 S.D. dependent var 2854.882
Sum squared resid 24452609 S.E. of regression 504.6927
R2 0.969070 Adjusted R2 0.968748
F(1,96) 2463.408 P-value(F) 2.99e–70
Log-likelihood −747.9927 Akaike criterion 1499.985
Schwarz criterion 1505.155 Hannan–Quinn 1502.077
ρˆ 0.628839 Durbin’s h 6.350763
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